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Abstract
Group judgments are often—implicitly or explicitly—influenced by
their members’ individual expertise. However, given that expertise is
seldom recognized fully and that some distortions may occur (bias, cor-
relation, etc.), it is not clear that differential weighting is an epistem-
ically advantageous strategy with respect to straight averaging. Our
paper characterizes a wide set of conditions under which differential
weighting outperforms straight averaging and embeds the results into
the multidisciplinary group decision-making literature.
1 Introduction
Groups frequently make judgments that are based on aggregating the opin-
ions of its individual members. A panel of market analysts at Apple or
Samsung may estimate the expected number of sales of a newly developed
cell phone. A group of conservation biologists may assess the population
size of a particular species in a specific habitat. A research group at the
European Central may evaluate the merits of a particular monetary policy.
Generally, such problems occur in any context where groups have to com-
bine various opinions into a single group judgment (for a review paper, see
Clemen 1989).
Even in cases of fully shared information, the assessment of the evidence
will generally vary among the agents and depend on factors such as profes-
sional training, familiarity with similar situations in the past, and personal
attitude toward the results. Thus, it will not come as a surprise that the
individual judgments may differ. But how shall they be aggregated?
Often, some group members are more competent than others. Recog-
nizing these experts may then become a crucial issue for improving group
performance. Research in social psychology and management science has
investigated the ability of humans to properly assess the expertise of other
group members in such contexts (Clemen 1989; Bonner, Baumann and Dalal
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2002; Larrick, Burson and Soll 2007). Most of this research stresses that rec-
ognizing experts is no easy task: perceived and actual expertise need not
agree, data are noisy, questions may be too hard, and expertise differences
may be too small to be relevant (e.g., Littlepage et al. 1995). This moti-
vates a comparison of two strategies for group judgments: (i) deferring to
the agent who is perceived as most competent, and (ii) taking the straight
average of the estimates (Henry 1995; Soll and Larrick 2009). The over-
all outcomes suggest that the straight average is often surprisingly reliable,
apparently being one of those “fast and frugal heuristics” (Gigerenzer and
Goldstein 1996) that help boundedly rational agents to make cost-effective
decisions.
On the other hand, even if not explicitly recognized as such, experts
tend to exert greater influence on group judgments than non-experts (Bon-
ner, Baumann and Dalal 2002). This motivates a principled epistemic anal-
ysis of the potential benefits of expertise-informed group judgments. We
characterize conditions under which differentially weighted averages, fed by
incomplete and perhaps distorted information on individual expertise, ame-
liorate group performance, compared to a straight average of the individual
judgments. Our paper approaches this question from an analytical perspec-
tive, that is, with the help of a statistical model. We following the social
permutation approach (e.g., Bonner 2000) and model the agents as unique
entities with different abilities. This differs notably from more traditional
social combination research where individual agents are modeled as inter-
changeable (e.g., Davis 1973). Our main result—that individual expertise
makes a robust contribution to group performance—is not without surprise,
given the generality of our conditions that also allow for perturbations such
as individual bias or correlations among the group members. Therefore, our
analytical results provide theoretical support to research on the recognition
of experts in groups (e.g., Baumann and Bonner 2004), and they directly
relate to empirical comparisons of differentially weighted group judgments
to “composite judgments”, such as the group mean or median (Einhorn,
Hogarth and Klempner 1977; Hill 1982; Libby, Trotman and Zimmer 1987;
Bonner 2004).
Our work is also related to two other research streams. First, there
is a thriving epistemological literature on peer disagreement and rational
consensus, where consensus is mostly reached by deference to (perceived)
experts. However, this debate either focuses on social power and mutual re-
spect relations (e.g., Lehrer and Wagner 1981), or on principled philosoph-
ical questions about resolving disagreement (e.g., Elga 2007). By means
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of a performance-focused mathematical model, we hope to bring this lit-
erature close to its primary target: the truth-tracking abilities of various
epistemic strategies. There is also a vast literature on group decisions pref-
erence and judgment aggregation (e.g., List 2012), but two crucial features
of our inquiry—the aggregation of numerical values and the particular role
of experts—do not play a major role in there.
Second, there is a fast increasing body of literature on expert judgment
and forecasting, which has emerged from applied mathematics and statistics
and became a flourishing interdisciplinary field. This strand of research
deals with the theoretical modeling of expert judgment, most notably the
(Bayesian) reconciliation of probability distributions (Lindley 1983), but
it also includes more practical questions such as comparison of calibration
methods, choice of seed variables, analyses of the use of expert judgment in
the past (Cooke 1991), and the study of general forecasting principles, such
as the benefits of opinion diversity (Armstrong 2001; Page 2007). We differ
from that approach in pooling individual (frequentist) estimators instead of
subjective probability distributions, but we study similar phenomena, such
as the impact of in-group correlations.
Admittedly, our baseline model is very simple, but due to this simplicity,
we are able to prove a number of results regarding the behavior of differen-
tially weighted estimates under correlation, bias and benchmark uncertainty.
Here, our paper builds on analytical work in the forecasting and social psy-
chology literature (Bates and Granger 1969; Hogarth 1978), following the
approach of Einhorn, Hogarth and Klempner (1977).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: we begin with explain-
ing the model and stating conditions where differentially weighted estimates
outperform the straight average (Sect. 2). In the sequel, we show that this
relation is often preserved even if bias or mutual correlations are introduced
(Sect. 3 and 4). Subsequently, we assess the impacts of over- and underconfi-
dence (Sect. 5). Finally, we discuss our findings and wrap up our conclusions
(Sect. 6).
2 The Model and Baseline Results
Our problem is to find a good estimate of an unknown quantity µ. For
reasons of convenience, we assume without loss of generality that µ = 0.1
1Rewriting our results for the general case µ 6= 0 is just a matter of affine transfor-
mation, but comes with some notational baggage. Therefore we focus without loss of
generality on µ = 0.
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We model the group members’ individual estimates Xi, i ≤ n, as inde-
pendent random variables that scatter around the true value µ = 0 with
variance σ2i . The Xi are unbiased estimators of µ, that is, they have the
property E[Xi] = µ. This baseline model is inspired by the idea that the
agents try to approach the true value with a higher or lower degree of preci-
sion, but have no systematic bias in either direction. The competence of an
agent is explicated as the degree of precision in estimating the true value.
No further assumptions on the distributions of the Xi are made—only the
first and second moments are fixed.
In this model, the question of whether the recognition of individual ex-
pertise is epistemically advantageous translates into the question of which
convex combination of the Xi, µ̂ :=
∑n
i=1 ciXi, outperforms the straight
average µ̄ := 1n
∑n
i=1Xi. Standardly, the quality of an estimate is assessed
by its mean square error (MSE) which can be calculated as
































Thus, naming the c∗i as the “optimal weights” is motivated by two indepen-
dent theoretical reasons:
1. As argued above, for independent and unbiased estimates Xi with
variance σ2i , mean square error of the overall estimate is minimized




iXi. Thus, for a standard loss
function, the c∗i are indeed the optimal weights.
2. Even when the square loss function is replaced by a more realistic
alternative (Hartmann and Sprenger 2010), the c∗i can still define the
optimal convex combination of individual estimates. In that case, we
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require stronger distributional assumptions.2
The problem with these optimal weights is that each agent’s individual
expertise would have to be known in order to calculate them. Given all the
biases that actual deliberation is loaded with, e.g., ascription of expertise
due to professional reputation, age or gender, or bandwagon effects, it is
unlikely that the agents succeed at unraveling the expertise of all other
group members (cf. Nadeau, Cloutier and Gray 1993; Armstrong 2001).
Therefore, we widen the scope of our inquiry:
Question: Under which conditions will differentially weighted
group judgments outperform the straight average?
A first answer is given by the following result where the differential weights
preserve the expertise ranking:
Theorem 1 (First Baseline Result) Let c1, . . . , cn > 0 be the weights
of the individual group members, that is,
∑n
i=1 ci = 1. Without loss of








Then the differentially weighted estimator µ̂ :=
∑n
i=1 ciXi outperforms the
straight average. That is, MSE(µ̂) ≤ MSE(µ̄), with equality if and only if
ci = 1/n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
This result demonstrates that relative accuracy, as measured by pairwise
expertise ratios, is a good guiding principle for group judgments as long as
the relative weights are not too extreme.
The following result extends this finding to a case where the benefits of
differential weighting are harder to anticipate: we allow the ci to lie in the
entire [1/n, c∗i ] (or [c
∗
i , 1/n]) interval, allowing for cases where the ranking of
the group members is not represented correctly. One might conjecture that
this phenomenon adversely affects performance, but this is not the case:
Theorem 2 (Second Baseline Result) Let c1 . . . cn ∈ [0, 1] such that
∑n
i=1 ci =
1. In addition, let ci ∈ [ 1n ; c
∗
i ] respectively ci ∈ [c∗i ; 1n ] hold for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Then the differentially weighted estimator µ̂ :=
∑n
i=1 ciXi outperforms the
straight average. That is, MSE(µ̂) ≤ MSE(µ̄), with equality if and only if
ci = 1/n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
2Hartmann and Sprenger (2010) prove the optimality of the c∗i for the case of Normally
distributed independent and unbiased estimates with variance σ2i and the loss function
family Lα(x) = 1− exp(−x2/2α2). That paper also contains an elaborate justification for
choosing this family of loss functions.
5
Note that none of the baseline results implies the other one. The condi-
tions of the second result can be satisfied even when the ranking of the group
members differs from their actual expertise, and a violation of the second
condition (e.g., c∗i = 1/n and ci = 1/n + ε) is compatible with satisfaction
of the first condition. So the two results are really complementary.
We have thus shown that differential weighting outperforms straight av-
eraging under quite general constraints on the individual weights, motivating
the efforts to recognize experts in practice. The next sections extend these
results to the presence of correlation and bias, thereby transferring them to
more realistic circumstances.
3 Biased Agents
The first extension of our model concerns biased estimates Xi, that is, esti-
mates that do not center around the true value µ = 0, but around Bi 6= 0.
We still assume that agents are honestly interested in getting close to the
truth, but that training, experience, risk attitude or personality structure
bias their estimates into a certain direction. For example, in assessing the
impact of industrial development on a natural habitat, an environmentalist
will usually come up with an estimate that significantly differs from the es-
timate submitted by an employee of an involved corporation—even if both
are intellectually honest and share the same information.
For a biased agent i, the competence/precision parameter σ2i has to be re-
interpreted: it should be understood as the coherence (or non-randomness)
of the agent’s estimates instead of the accuracy. This value is indicative of
accuracy only if the bias Bi is relatively small.
Under these circumstances, we can identify an intuitive sufficient condi-
tion for differential weighting to outperform straight averaging.
Theorem 3 Let X1, . . . , Xn be random variables with bias B1, . . . , Bn.
(a) Suppose that the ci in the estimator µ̂ =
∑n
i=1 ciXi satisfy one of the
conditions of the baseline results (i.e., either 1 ≤ ci/cj ≤ c∗i /c∗j or















Then differential weighting outperforms straight averaging, that is,
MSE(µ̂) < MSE(µ̄).
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Then differential weighting does worse than straight averaging if con-
dition (b) holds, that is, MSE(µ̂) > MSE(µ̄).
Intuitively, condition (4) states that the differentially weighted bias is
smaller or equal than the average bias. As one would expect, this property
favorably affects the performance of the differentially weighted estimator.
Condition (5) states, on the other hand, that if the difference between the
mean square biases of the weighted and the straight average exceeds the
mean variance of the agents, then straight averaging performs better than
weighted averaging.
When the group size grows to a very large number, both parts of Theo-
rem 3 collapse into a single condition, as long as the biases and variances are
both bounded. This is quite obvious since the second term of (5) is of the
order O(1/n). Theorem 3 applies in particular in the case where agents are
biased into the same direction and less biased agents make more coherent
estimates (that is, with smaller variance):
Corollary 1 Let X1, . . . , Xn, be random variables with bias B1, . . . , Bn ≥ 0
such that ci ≥ cj implies Bi ≥ Bj (or vice versa for B1, . . . , Bn ≤ 0). Then,
with the same definitions as above:
• MSE(µ̄) ≥ MSE(µ̂).
• If there is a uniform group bias, that is, B := B1 = . . . = Bn, then
MSE(µ̄)−MSE(µ̂) is independent of B.
So even if all agents have followed the same training, or have been raised
in the same ideological framework, expertise recognition does not multiply
that bias, but helps to increase the accuracy of the group’s judgment. In
particular, if there is a uniform bias in the group, the relative advantage of
differential weighting is indepedent of the size of the bias. All in all, these
results demonstrate the importance of expertise recognition even in groups




We turn to violations of independence between the group members. Con-
sider first the following fact that compares two groups with different degrees
of correlation:
Fact 1 If 0 ≤ E [XiXj ] ≤ E [YiYj ] ∀i 6= j ≤ n and E[X2i ] = E[X2j ], then
both straight averaging and weighted averaging on Xi yield a lower mean
square error than the same procedures applied to Yi.
Fact 1 shows that less correlated groups perform better, ceteris paribus.
For practical purposes, this suggests that heterogeneity of a group is an
epistemic virtue since strong correlations between the agents are less likely
to occur, making the overall result more accurate (cf. Page 2007).
Regarding the comparison of straight and weighted averaging, we can
show the following result:
Theorem 4 Let X1, . . . , Xn be unbiased estimators, that is, E[Xi] = µ = 0,
and let the ci satisfy the conditions of one of the baseline results, with µ̂
defined as before. Let I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} be a subset of the group members with
the property
∀i, j 6= k ∈ I : ci ≥ cj ⇒ E[XjXk] ≥ E[XiXk] ≥ 0. (6)
(i) Correlation vs. Expertise If I = {1, . . . , n}, then weighted averaging
outperforms straight averaging, that is, MSE(µ̂) ≤ MSE(µ̄).












Then weighted averaging still outperforms straight averaging, that is,
MSE(µ̂) ≤ MSE(µ̄).
To fully understand this theorem, we have to clarify the meaning of con-
dition (6). Basically, it says that in group I, experts are less with correlated
with other (sub)group members than non-experts.3
Once we have understood this condition, the rest is straightforward.
Part (i) states that if I equals the entire group, then differential weighting
3Recall that E[Xi, Xk] ≤ E[Xj , Xk] can be rewritten as σi/σj ≤ ρjk/ρik with ρij
defined as the Pearson correlation coefficient ρij := E[XiXj ]/σiσj . Also, if ci ≥ cj then
automatically σi ≤ σj .
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has an edge over averaging. That is, the benefits of expertise recognition
are not offset by the perturbations that mutual dependencies may introduce.
Arguably, the generality of the result is surprising since condition (6) is quite
weak. Part (ii) states that differential weighting is also superior whenever
there is no correlation with the rest of the group, and as long as the average
competence in the subgroup is lower than the overall average competence
(see equation (7)).
It is a popular opinion (e.g., Surowiecki 2004) that correlation of individ-
ual judgments is one of the greatest dangers for relying on experts in a group.
To some extent, this opinion is vindicated by Fact 1 in our model. How-
ever, expertise-informed group judgments may still be superior to composite
judgments, as demonstrated by Theorem 4. The interplay of correlation and
expertise is subtle and not amenbale to broad-brush generalizations.
5 Over- and Underconfidence
We now consider a specific family of ci’s in order to study how group mem-
bers’ self-assessment in terms of quality affects group performance as a
whole, modeled again as unbiased estimates Xi with variance σ
2
i .
Suppose that the group members have some idea of their own compe-
tence. That is, they are able to position themselves in relation to a commonly
known benchmark : they are able to assess how much better or worse they
expect themselves to perform compared to a default agent, modeled as a un-
biased random variable with variance s2. Such a scenario may be plausible
when agents have a track record of their performance, or obtain performance
feedback. The agents then express how much weight they should ideally get







s2 + (n− 1)σ2i
(8)
Assume further that every agent uses the same benchmark, that these
weights also determine to what extent a group member compromises his
or her own position, and that decision-making takes place on the basis of
the normalized ci’s. It can then be shown (proof omitted) that the differ-
entially weighted estimator µ̂ defined by equation (8) outperforms straight
averaging—in fact, this is entailed by the Second Baseline Result (Theorem
2).
Here, we want to study how over- and underestimating the competence
of a “default agent” will affect group performance. Is it always epistemically
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detrimental when the agents misguess the group competence?
The answer is, perhaps surprisingly, no. To explain this result, we first
observe that the less confidence we have in the group (= s2 is large), the
more does the weighted average resemble the straight average. Recalling
equation (8), we note that all ci will be very close to 1. This implies that
the expertise-informed average will roughly behave like the straight average.
Conversely, if the group is perceived as competent (=small value of s),
then the ci will typically not be close to 1 such that differential weights will
diverge significantly from the straight average. This intuitive insight leads
to the following theorem:
Theorem 5 Let µ̂s2 and µ̂s̃2 be two weighted, expertise-informed estimates
of µ, defined according to equation (8) with benchmarks s2 and s̃2, respec-
tively. Then MSE(µ̂s2) ≤ MSE(µ̂s̃2) if and only if s2 ≤ s̃2.
It can also be shown (proof omitted) that this procedure approximates the
optimal weights c∗i if the perceived group competence approaches perfection,
that is, s → 0. In other words, as long as the group members judge them-
selves accurately, optimism with regard to the abilities of the other group
members is epistemically favorable. On the other hand, overconfidence in
one’s own abilities relative to the group typically deteriorates performance.
6 Discussion
We have set up an estimation model of group decision-making in order to
study the effects of individual expertise on the quality of a group judg-
ment. We have shown that in general, taking into account relative accuracy
positively affects the epistemic performance of groups. Translated into our
statistical model, this means that differential weighting outperforms straight
averaging, even if the ranking of the experts is not represented accurately.
The result remains stable over several representative extensions of the
model, such as various forms of bias, violations of independence, and over-
and underconfident agents (Theorems 3–5). In particular, we demonstrated
that differential weighting is superior (i) if experts are, on average, less
biased; (ii) for a group of uniformly biased agents; (iii) if experts are less
correlated with the rest of the group than other members. We also showed
that uniform overconfidence in one’s own abilities is detrimental for group
performance whereas (over)confidence in the group may be beneficial. These
properties may be surprising and demonstrate the stability and robustness
of expertise-informed judgments, implying that the benefits of recognizing
experts may offset the practical problems linked with that process.
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Our model can in principle also be used for describing how groups ac-
tually form judgments. In that case, the involved tasks should neither be
too intellective (that is, there is a demonstrable solution) or too judgmental
(Laughlin and Ellis 1986): in highly intellective tasks, group will typically
not perform better than the best individual (=the one who has solved the
task correctly). This differs from our model where any agent has only partial
knowledge of the truth. On the other hand, if the task is too judgmental,
any epistemic component will be removed and the individual weights may
actually be based on the centrality of a judgment, such as in Hinsz’s (1999)
SDS-Q scheme.
Finally, we name some distinctive traits of our model. First, unlike other
models of group judgments that are detached from the group members’
individual abilities (Davis 1973; DeGroot 1974; Lehrer and Wagner 1981;
Hinsz 1999), it is a genuinely epistemic model, evaluating the performance
of different ways of making a group judgment.4 Thus, our model can be used
normatively, for supporting the use of differential weights in group decisions,
but also descriptively, for fitting the results of group decision processes.
Second, we did not make any specific distributional assumptions on how
the agents estimate the target value. Our assumptions merely concern the
first and second moment (bias and variance). We consider this parsimony
a prudent choice because those distributions will greatly vary in practice,
and we do not have epistemic access to them. Classical work in the social
combination literature makes much more specific distributional assumptions
(e.g., the multinomial distributions in Thomas and Fink 1961 and Davis
1973), restricting the scope of that analysis.
Third, we are not aware of other analytical models that take into account
important confounders such as correlation, bias and over-/underconfident
agents. Thus, we conclude that our model makes a substantial contribution
to understanding the epistemic benefits of expertise in group judgments.
A Proofs of the Theorems
We will need the following inequalities repeatedly in the subsequent proofs.









4Lehrer and Wagner also defend their model from a normative point of view, but their
arguments for this claim are not particularly persuasive, see e.g., Martini, Sprenger and
Colyvan (2013).
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again with equality if and only if c1 = . . . = cn. Both inequalities are special
cases of the Power Mean Theorem (cf. Wilf 1985, 258).
For the First Baseline Result, we need the following
Lemma 1 Let k < n and let (c1, . . . , cn) be a sequence such that
(1)
∑n
i=1 ci = s for some s > 0 and all ci are positive;
(2) c1 = . . . = ck and ck+1 = . . . = cn;














Furthermore, we show that under the above conditions (i.e.
∑n
i=1 ci = s),








Proof of Lemma 1: Fix r such that
• ci = sn −
r
k for i ≤ k
• ci = sn +
r
n−k for i > k




















































Now the left hand side of the above equation is a quadratic function in r



































Now this is a function of the form kx−ax+b with a, b > 0. Since these functions





















(σ − 1)σk+1k(n− k)
σk+1((n− k)σ + k)


















(σ − 1)k(n− k)
(n− k)− σk
In particular r < r0, finishing the proof of (11). For the last statement of
Lemma 1, observe that the left hand side of (11) is a quadratic function
with minimum 12r0, and that r ≤
1
2r0. 
Proof of Theorem 1: By assumption the ci are ordered increasingly,
thus the σi are ordered decreasingly. For a vector of weights w ∈ Rn (i.e. all
wi positiv and
∑
iwi = 1), we denote the mean square error of the estimator∑




Thus for c = (c1 . . . cn) as in the theorem we have to show Ψ(c) ≤ Ψ(e),
where e is the equal weight vector ( 1n , . . . ,
1
n). To this end we will construct
a sequence of weight vectors e = d0, . . . ,dn−1 = c such that:
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(i) each di satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1;
(ii) for di = (d1 . . . dn), there is some k ∈ N such that
d1 = . . . = dk and d1 > c1; . . . ; dk > ck;
dj = cj for k < j ≤ k + i (where i is the index of di);
dk+i+1 = . . . = dn and dk+i+1 ≤ ck+i+1; . . . ; dn ≤ cn;
(iii) Ψ(di−1) ≥ Ψ(di).
Thus di−1 = c and Ψ(c) ≤ Ψ(e) as desired. The di are constructed induc-
tively as follows: Assume di−1 = (d
′
1 . . . d
′
n) has already been constructed. If
i = 1 let k be the unique index such that ck <
1
n and ck+1 ≥
1
n . If i > 1 let k
be as in the above conditions for di−1. First note that if k = 0, then d
′
j ≤ cj
for all j and thus di−1 = c since both are weight vectors and we are done.
Thus assume k ≥ 1 for the rest of the proof. With a similar argument, we
can show that k + i+ 1 ≤ n. Now choose the maximal r ∈ R that satisfies
d′k − ck ≥
r
k
ck+i+1 − d′k+i+1 ≥
r
n− k − i− 1
(13)
By the above conditions, r ≥ 0. Then define di = (d1, . . . , dn) by:
• dj = d′j − rk for j ≤ k;
• dj = cj for k < j ≤ k + i;
• dj = d′j + rn−k−i−1 for j ≥ k + i+ 1.
To see that di satisfies conditions (i)-(iii), first note that since r was chosen to
be maximal, one of the two inequalities in (13) has to be an equality. Thus

















n− k − i− 1
= 1
Using that the ci are ordered increasingly, it is easy to see that di satisfies
the assumptions of Theorem 1. Furthermore, applying the monotonicity











i . Thus Ψ(di) ≤ Ψ(di−1) since di−1 and di coincide
outside I. This finishes the proof. 
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Proof of Theorem 2: We would like to show that the mean square
error of the straight average µ̄ := (1/n)
∑n
i=1Xi exceeds the mean square
error of the weighted estimate µ̂. The MSE difference can be calculated as































(cf. equation (2)). Thus, instead of considering ∆, it suffices to show that









To this end, let Ii := [1/n; c
∗
i ] (respectively [c
∗
i ; 1/n]) and let Q := I1× . . .×
In. Then,








c2i is a positive determinate quadratic form in the ci, we get that
∆′−1([0;∞)) is convex. Thus, it suffices to show that ∆′ is positive on
the vertices of D. Note that since {x|
∑
xi = 1} is of dimension n − 1,
the vertices of D are of the form v = (c∗1, . . . , c∗k−1, ck, 1/n, . . . , 1/n)—the
ordering is assumed for convenience, and ck is defined such that ||v||1 = 1.
Thus we have to show that ∆′(c∗1, . . . , c
∗
k−1, ck, 1/n, . . . , 1/n) ≥ 0.
In the case k = 1, the desired inequality holds trivially since ck = 1 −
(n−1) · (1/n) = 1/n. Thus we assume k > 1 for the remainder of this proof.






Observe that for ci =
1
n the corresponding summands in ∆
′ vanish. Thus









































Since the ci add up to one, we can express the dependency between l and
ck by
ck =
(k − 1)(1− l) + 1
n




Inserting this into (14) gives






n(k − 1)− 1
c∗k
(



















(1 + l)n− l
c∗k
((1− l)(k − 1) + 2)
)]
Since the first factor is always positive, it suffices to show that the factor in
the square brackets, denoted by P (l), is positive for every l that can occur
in our setting. We do this by a case distinction on the value of c∗k
Case 1: c∗k ≤ 1/n. Noting ck ∈ [c∗k,
1
n ] and the dependency (15) between
l and ck, we have to show that P (l) ≥ 0 for all l ∈ [1;
k−nc∗k
k−1 ]. We observe
that P is a polynomial of third order with zero points of P given by P (1) = 0
and
r± =
k + 1− nc∗k ±
√
(k + 1− nc∗k)2 − 4(k − 1)c∗kn
2(k − 1)
with r+ denoting the larger of these two numbers. With some algebra it also
follows that P ′(1) ≥ 0 if and only if ck∗ ≤ 1/n. From the functional form of
P (l)—a polynomial of the third degree with negative leading coefficient—we
can then infer that l = 1 must be the middle zero point of P . To prove that
P (l) ≥ 0 in the critical interval, it remains to show that for the rightmost










k + 1− c∗kn+
√
(k + 1− nc∗k)2 − 4(k − 1)c∗kn
2(k − 1)
⇔k − 1− nc∗k ≤
√
(k + 1− nc∗k)2 − 4(k − 1)c∗kn
⇔c∗kn ≤1
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completing the proof for the case ck∗ ≤ 1/n.




k−1 ; 1]. The same calculations as above yield
k − nc∗k
k − 1
≥ r+ if and only if c∗kn ≥ 1.
in particular r+ < 1. Thus l always lies between the middle and the right-
most zero point of P (l), and in particular, P (l) ≥ 0 for all l ∈ [k−nc
∗
k
k−1 ; 1]. 
Proof of Theorem 3: Let the Xi center around Bi > 0. Then E[Xi−Bi] =

































Like in Theorem 2, we define ∆(c1, . . . , cn) := MSE(µ̄) − MSE(µ̂) as the
difference in mean square error between both estimates and show that
∆(c1, . . . , cn) ≥ 0 if equation (4) is satisfied.


























By Theorem 1 and/or Theorem 2, the first line is greater or equal to zero, and
by equation (4), the second line is also non-negative. Thus ∆(c1, . . . , cn) ≥ 0,
showing the superiority of differential weighting.


















Proof of Corollary 1: It is easy to see that the conditions of the corollary
satisfy the requirements of part (a) of Theorem 3. This yields the desired
result for the first part of the theorem. For the second, part, let the Xi all























Therefore, under the conditions of the theorem,











showing that ∆ only depends on the centered estimates. 


























E [YiYj ] ≥ 0









. The proof for differential weights is similar, making use of the fact
that the ci are the same for Xi and Yi because they only depend on the
variance of the random variable. 
Proof of Theorem 4, part (i): First, assume without loss of generality
that ci ≥ ci+1 for all i < n. Thus, our assumption on the E[XiXj ] reduces
to E[XiXk] ≤ E[XjXk] for i ≥ j 6= k. First, we show the theorem under
the assumption that all E[XiXj ] with i 6= j are equal, say E[XiXj ] = γ. By












cicj E [XiXj ] ≥ 0
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 ≥ 0 (17)





under the constraints x1, . . . , xn ≥ 0 and
∑




















j=1 ci cj = (
∑n
i=1 ci)
2 = 1 and combining this equality




















2 ≥ 0 (19)
thus proving the statement in the case that all E[XiXj ] are the same.
For the general case let us assume that not all ci are the same (otherwise
the theorem is trivially true). Thus we either have c1 > cn−1 or c2 > cn
since the ci are ordered decreasingly. In the following, we assume c2 > cn,










cicj E [XiXj ] .
Thus, we can concentrate on {E[XiXj ]|i > j}. We fix a natural number c
and let Sc be the set of all vectors (E[XiXj ])(i>j) fulfilling the conditions of
our theorem and
∑


























cicj E [XiXj ]

on Sc. Observe that every Sc contains exactly one point eeq where all
E[XiXj ] are equal. By the first part of this proof, ϕ̃(eeq) is non-negative.
Thus, it suffices to show that eeq is an absolute minimum of ϕ̃ on Sc. First,















cicj E [XiXj ] (20)
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attains its maximum on Sc in eeq.
To do so, we show the following: For every e ∈ Sc with e 6= eeq there is
some e′ ∈ Sc with ϕ(e′) > ϕ(e). In particular, ϕ does not take its maximum
on Sc in e. Thus assume that e = (E[XiXj ])(i>j) ∈ Sc is given. Since e 6= eeq
there are some indices s > t and k > l such that E[XsXt] 6= E[XkXl].
Furthermore, we can assume that t ≥ l. Without loss of generality (by
potentially replacing one of the two entries with E[XsXl]) we can assume
that either s = k or t = l. In the following we assume s = k, the other
case works similar. The idea of the following construction is: We show that
moving towards a more equal distribution of the entries E[XiXj ] increases
ϕ(e). In particular, we construct e′ = (E′[XiXj ])(i>j) ∈ Sc as follows: In
every row ri := 〈E[XiX1] . . .E[XiXi−1]〉 of e we replace all the entries of this
































In particular e′ is in Sc. Furthermore, we have assumed that the ci are
ordered decreasingly. Recall that ck > cj implies E[XiXk] ≤ E[XiXj ] by
assumption, therefore the rows ri were ordered increasingly, and thus the
rows of e′ − e:
E′[Xi, X1]− E[XiX1]; . . . ;E′[Xi, Xi−1]− E[XiXi−1]
are ordered decreasingly (since the rows of e′ are constant). In particular,




E′[XiXj ]− E[XiXj ] ≤
∑
j<i
cicj(E′[XiXj ]− E[XiXj ]) (21)
where the ≤ comes from the fact that both cj and E′[XiXj ]− E[XiXj ] are



























E′[XsXj ]− E[XsXj ]
)
+ E′[XsXt]− E[XsXt] + E′[XsXl]− E[XsXl]
with both,∑
j<s,j 6=t,l





E′[XsXj ]− E[XsXj ]
)
and
E′[XsXt]− E[XsXt] + E′[XsXl]− E[XsXl]
≤ csct(E′[XsXt]− E[XsXt]) + cscl(E′[XsXl]− E[XsXl]).
By construction we have E[XsXt] 6= E[XsXl], thus we would have a strict
inequality in the last summand (and thus in the entire sum) if we knew that
ct 6= cl. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. However, we have put
ourselves in a situation where applying the same construction again with
E′[X2X1] and E′[XnX1] replacing E[XsXt] and E[XsXl] yields the desired
(since we have assumed that c2 > cn. To see this, observe that
• E[X2X1] = E′[X2X1] by construction
• E′[XsX1] > E[XsX1] since E[XsXt] 6= E[Xs, Xl] and E[XsX1] is the
minimal element in the row rs
• E[X2X1] ≤ E[XsX1] by assumption
Thus we have
E′[X2X1] = E[X2X1] ≤ E[XsX1] < E′[XsX1] ≤ E′[XnX1]
By assumption we have c2 > cn and repeating the construction from above
with coloumns replacing rows and E′[X2, X1],E′[Xn, X1] as the two refer-
ence points yields the desired.
Proof of Theorem 4, part (ii): We have to show that the statement
holds if all E[XiXj ] with i 6= j ∈ I are the same. The step from this case to
21
the general statement works as in the proof above. As in the proof of i), it













Let c̄ = 1|I|
∑


























with the last inequality coming from our assumption that c̄ < 1.
Proof of Theorem 5: Let the benchmark agent have standard deviation
s > 0, that is, variance s2. We will show that ∆(s, σ1, . . . , σn)—the MSE
difference between the differentially weighted and the straight average—is
strictly monotonically decreasing in the first argument. To this effect, we
calculate


















































































0 , it suffices to show that:(






We show that the terms in both brackets have the same sign.
For the first bracket we have:
σ2i ci − σ2j cj = s2
σ2i
s2 + (n− 1)σ2i
− s2
σ2j
s2 + (n− 1)σ2j
= s4
σ2i − σ2j
(s2 + (n− 1)σ2i )(s2 + (n− 1)σ2j )
which is larger than or equal to 0 if and only if σ2i > σ
2
j . Similarly, we
observe for the second bracket that
c′i =
2(n− 1)sσ2i
(s2 + (n− 1)σ2i )2
.




(s2 + (n− 1)σ2i )2
· s
2
s2 + (n− 1)σ2j
−
2(n− 1)sσ2j
(s2 + (n− 1)σ2j )2
· s
2
s2 + (n− 1)σ2i
= 2(n− 1)s5
σ2i − σ2j
(s2 + (n− 1)σ2i )2(s2 + (n− 1)σ2j )2
Thus, both factors in (22) have the same sign, implying ∂∂s∆(s, σ1, . . . , σn) ≤
0 which is want we wanted to prove. 
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